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RUBIS

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR V. PENNSYLVANIA: THE
NOT SO LITTLE EFFECT OF INTERFERING WITH THE
ACA’S CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE
SABRINA RUBIS*
INTRODUCTION

In Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania,1 the Supreme Court decided whether government
agencies created lawful exemptions from a regulatory requirement of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that requires employers to provide
contraceptive coverage to their employees through their employerbased health insurance plans.2 This requirement is known as the
“contraceptive mandate.”3 The Court’s decision ultimately turned on its
interpretation of the ACA’s language. The Supreme Court, in a 7-2
decision, upheld the two blanket exemptions, allowing employers and
educational institutions to opt out of providing contraception to their
employees and students due to their religious or conscientious beliefs.4
© 2021 Sabrina Rubis
*JD Candidate 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like
to thank my parents, Russ and Gloria Rubis, for their endless support and whose unconditional
love, sacrifice, and strength have profoundly shaped the person I am today. I would like to thank
my sister, Oksana Rubis, for her encouragement, wisdom, for being my rock and listening ear,
and for being an exceptional example for empathy, determination, and being unapologetically
yourself. I would also like to thank Professor Paula Monopoli for her guidance and valuable
insight over the years, whose class inspired me to write this advocacy piece. I would like to
express my gratitude to the many editors of the Journal of Race, Religion, Gender & Class for
their hard work and contributions to this case note. I would also like to thank my family and
friends for their kindness and support, especially during the times I needed it the most. Last but
not least, this article is dedicated to all women—both in my life and beyond—whose voices
deserve to be continuously uplifted, empowered, and heard.
1 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
2 Id. at 2372-73.
3 Id. at 2373. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (“A group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide
coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for . . . with respect to women,
such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for
purposes of this paragraph.”).
4 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2386. See also Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania
and
New
Jersey/Trump
v.
Pennsylvania
and
New
Jersey,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/cases/little-sisters-poor-v-pennsylvania-and-new-jerseytrump-vpennsylvania-and-new-jersey (last visited Jan. 7, 2022); Brief for ACLU as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 2, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020)
(No. 19-431, 19-454) (explaining that both employers and universities my deny health care
coverage to their female employees and students).
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The Court was wrong in its decision to uphold the broad blanket
exemptions, which now deny tens of thousands of women seamless
access to no-cost contraceptive coverage under the ACA. The Court
failed to adequately weigh the exemptions’ detrimental impact on
women.5 The Court should have given greater weight to the history of
the Women’s Health Amendment, the role of gender in shaping policy,
and legal precedent.6 The Court should have also utilized the
Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard when
analyzing the exemptions.7 Lastly, the Court’s decision leaves many
legal questions unanswered, which may have broader implications in
the areas of constitutional law, civil rights law, and gender rights law.8
I.

THE CASE

Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania was a 2020 U.S.
Supreme Court case that followed a series of cases concerning the
“legality of agency rules providing religious and moral exemptions to
the contraception mandate created under the Affordable Care Act.”9 The
contraception mandate is carved out from a provision of the ACA and
requires employers to provide their employees with all Food and Drug
Administration-approved contraceptive protection in their employerbased health insurance plans.10 The statute reads: “‘with respect to
women,’ ‘[a] group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering
group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum
provide . . . such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).’”11
Since the mandate’s inception in 2011, numerous religious
employers objected to the mandate, asserting that this provision of
contraceptive health care coverage would infringe on their religious

5

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
7 See infra Section IV.C.
8 See infra Section IV.D.
9 Little
Sisters
of
the
Poor
v.
Pennsylvania,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Little_Sisters_of_the_Poor_Saints_Peter_and_Paul_Home_v._Pennsylv
ania (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
10 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2374 (2012) (citing Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54)).
11 Id. at 2379-80 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
6
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rights and beliefs.12 The Little Sisters of the Poor, an international
congregation of Roman Catholic women who have “operated homes for
the elderly poor in the United States since 1868,”13 were one of many
religious organizations that had opposed the contraception mandate for
years.14
After years of litigation, and in response to the concern of
religious employers, the Departments of Health and Human Services
(HHS), Labor, and Treasury (together, hereinafter “Departments” or
“government”) carved out certain exemptions and accommodations for
objecting religious employers.15 Religious employers, like the Little
Sisters, continued to challenge these accommodations as a violation of
their religious rights, but appellate courts around the country held that
this process did not violate their rights and ruled against them.16
In 2013, the Little Sisters went to court seeking an exemption
from the mandate but lost at both the district court and appellate court
levels.17 At this point, the Sisters appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and Justice Sotomayor “issued an emergency injunction to grant
immediate relief for the Little Sisters.”18 In 2014, the Court granted an
injunction against enforcement of the contraceptive mandate and the
need to use the accommodation while the case continued.19 Later, in
2016, the Supreme Court overturned lower courts’ decisions, instructing
the government and religious organizations to find a solution that would

12 Id. at 2374. Many employers objected to the contraceptive mandate, maintaining that this
provision of contraceptive coverage violated their religious beliefs, including the belief that life
starts at conception and that using contraception to avoid procreation is morally wrong. Many
employers also felt that certain services provided in the FDA-approved contraceptive methods
(Plan B, sterilization, etc.) would make the employer “complicit in abortion.” Id. at 2377.
13 Id.
at 2375. See also Mission Statement, LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR,
https://littlesistersofthepoor.org/mission-statement/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
14 BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 9.
15 See infra Section II.
16
See Katie Keith, Will The Supreme Court Take Up The Contraceptive Mandate (Again)?,
HEALTH
AFFS.
(Jan.
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200107.852383/full/.
17 On
the
Road
to
the
Supreme
Court
(again),
BECKET,
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mpc801bpr34r7uh/LSP%202020%20Timeline.pdf?dl=0
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2021).
18 Id.
19 See W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, RFRA Protections in the Contraceptive Mandate
Litigation, in 1 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 3.20 (2d ed. 2020) (citing Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Sebelius, 571 U.S. 1171 (2014) (stating
that the Supreme Court granted an injunction until the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit “decided on the merits of the Little Sisters’ challenge”)).
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accommodate both religious groups and employees seeking
contraceptive coverage.20
Following a series of Supreme Court cases and continued
challenges to the accommodation by religious groups,21 under Trump’s
administration, HHS created broader blanket exemptions to the
contraceptive mandate in October of 2017.22 These new exemptions,
which now included a “moral” component, expanded those employers
and institutions eligible for the exemption to include religious non-profit
and for-profit entities who have religious or conscientious objections.23
Additionally, these new rules were promulgated by the Departments
without first issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public
comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).24
Within a week of the promulgation of these new exemptions,
many states, including Pennsylvania, sued the federal government,
maintaining that the exemptions were both “procedurally and
substantively invalid.”25 Specifically, Pennsylvania filed an action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the state of New Jersey joined
Pennsylvania’s suit, and both states filed an amended complaint.26
Together, they challenged the exemptions in federal district court,
maintaining that the new exemptions violate the U.S. Constitution,
federal anti-discrimination law, and the APA.27
Pennsylvania and New Jersey further maintained that the final
“rules were substantively unlawful because the Departments lacked
statutory authority under either the ACA or the [Religious Freedom
Restoration Act] (RFRA) to promulgate the exemptions.”28 The states
also argued that that the exemption violated the APA because they were
“not adequately justified by good cause, meaning that the Departments
20 See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 60 (2016); see also Zack Smith, Little Sisters of Poor
Win Big at Supreme Court, But Fight Isn’t Over, DAILY SIGNAL (July 8, 2020),
https://www.dailysignal.com/2020/07/08/little-sisters-of-poor-win-big-at-supreme-court-butthe-fight-isnt-over/ (“[The] Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell basically told both the religious
organizations and the federal government to work out their disagreements and find a solution.
In doing so, the court did not rule on the merits of whether the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act required the organizations to be exempted from the mandate.”).
21 Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2375 (2020).
22 On the Road to the Supreme Court (again), supra note 17.
23 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2378.
24 Id. at 2384.
25 Id. at 2378.
26 Id. The amended complaint argued that the newly promulgated rules were invalid under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id.
27 Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 560, 576 n.9 (3d Cir. 2019).
28 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2378.
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impermissibly used the Interim Final Rule (IFR) procedure to bypass
the APA’s notice and comment procedures.”29 Lastly, the states
maintained that the “purported procedural defects of the IFRs likewise
infected” the final exemptions.30
After holding a hearing and reviewing evidence submitted by the
states, the District Court held that the states were likely to succeed on
both claims and granted a preliminary nationwide injunction against the
broad exemptions and enjoined their enforcement.31 The federal
government then appealed this decision, “as did one of the homes
operated by the Little Sisters, which had in the meantime joined the suit
to defend the religious exemption.”32 The Little Sisters appealed the
District Court’s preliminary injunction, and that appeal was
consolidated with the federal government’s appeal.33
While that appeal was pending, the Departments issued rules
finalizing the exemptions. However, in 2019, the Third Circuit held that
the Departments lacked statutory and procedural authority to
promulgate these exemptions and affirmed the District Court’s
nationwide injunction.34 First, the Third Circuit interpreted the ACA as
authorizing the government agencies to determine which services to
include as preventive care, but not to carve out exemptions from those
requirements.35 Second, the court disagreed that the previous
accommodation “substantially burdened the Little Sisters’ free exercise
29 Id. See generally Brian Wolfman & Bradley Girard, Argument preview: The
Administrative Procedure Act, notice-and-comment rule making, and “interpretive”
rules, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 26, 2014, 10:13 AM) (“The APA generally requires that, to become
effective, a legislative rule must go through what is known as notice-and-comment rulemaking
– a lengthy process in which the public is given an opportunity to comment on a proposed
version of the rule and the agency responds to the comments.”); OFF. FED. REG., A GUIDE TO
THE
RULEMAKING
PROCESS
(2011),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (explaining that
“when an agency finds that it has good cause to issue a final rule without first publishing a
proposed rule, it often characterizes the rule as an ‘interim final rule,’ or ‘interim rule’”); MAEVE
P. CAREY, THE FED. RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 7-8 (CONG. RES. SERV. 2013). Interim
final rules were created to assist agencies in moving more quickly, often used to get around the
notice and comment process. Agencies typically utilize interim final rules when they believe
that rule will not be contested or is non-controversial, with that rule becoming immediately
effective after the comment period. Id.
30 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2378.
31 Id. at 2378-79. The District Court issued this injunction against the implementation of the
exemptions the same day the exemptions were scheduled to take effect. Id.
32 Id. at 2379. The Little Sisters initially moved to intervene in the District Court to defend the
2017 religious-exemption IFR, but the District Court denied that motion. The Third Circuit later
reversed. Id.
33 Id. This case is consolidated with the case Trump v. Pennsylvania. 140 S. Ct. 918, 919 (2020).
34 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2378-79.
35 Id. at 2379.
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rights and thus rejected their RFRA claim.”36 Third, the Third Circuit
held that the RFRA did not compel or allow the religious exemption
because they had concluded that the accommodation process did not
impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.37 Fourth,
the Third Circuit held that the Departments violated the APA by not
providing notice of proposed rulemaking and “lacked good cause to
bypass” this process when promulgating the 2017 IFRs (exemptions).38
Fifth, the Third Circuit decided that because the IFRs and final rules
were virtually identical, “[t]he notice and comment exercise
surrounding the Final Rules [did] not reflect any real openmindedness.”39 Finally, the Third Circuit held that the Little Sisters
lacked standing to intervene in the suit and appeal.40
In 2019, the Little Sisters appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court
after losing in the Third Circuit, and in 2020, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the lower court’s decision.41
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Little Sisters litigation has an extensive history, raising
many foundational issues including separation of church and state,
religious freedom, standing law, administrative law, statutory

36 Id. at 2376. See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 573 (3d Cir. 2019) (The
Third Circuit did not find religious objectors’ disapproval of the accommodation process to
be persuasive because the court is required to examine the conduct of the objector, not third
parties, and through the accommodation process, all the conduct falls on third parties to
provide contraception.
37 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2379.
38 Id. “Respondents point to the fact that the 2018 final rules were preceded by a document
entitled ‘Interim Final Rules with Request for Comments,’ not a document entitled ‘General
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.’ They claim that since this was insufficient to satisfy § 553(b)’s
requirement, the final rules were procedurally invalid.” Id. at 2384.
39 Id. at 2379 (quoting Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 568-569 (3d Cir. 2019)).
See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 569 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v.
Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2013); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431,
449-50 (3d Cir. 2011)) (alteration in original) (“‘[A] chance to comment . . . [enables] “the
agency to maintain [] a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its own rules . . . .’” In sum,
‘[t]he opportunity for comment must be a meaningful opportunity.’”).
40 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2379 n.6. The Third Circuit held that the Little Sisters
lacked appellate standing because a District Court had already enjoined the mandate from being
applied to plans which the Little Sisters were a part of. However, the Court disagreed with the
lower court, finding that the Little Sisters had standing because the federal government, the
other party to the suit, “clearly had standing to invoke the Third Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction,”
and both parties sought to get rid of the injunction against the religious exemption. Id.
41 Id. at 2379.
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interpretation, and women’s rights issues.42 The core of this case deals
with the ACA’s contraceptive mandate, which has existed for over a
decade.43 Litigation around this mandate has lasted just as long. Section
II.A will discuss an overview of the Affordable Care Act of 2010
(ACA), the Women’s Health Amendment (WHA), and the
Contraceptive Mandate.44 Section II.B will discuss the promulgation of
Interim Final Rules (IFRs) in an effort to modify the contraceptive
mandate and the subsequent litigation that resulted.45 Section II.C will
discuss the history and outcome of precedent cases and the
Departments’ attempts at complying with these decisions.46 Section II.D
will discuss the two broad exemptions created in light of Hobby Lobby
and Zubik.47
A. Overview of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the Women’s
Health Amendment, and the Contraceptive Mandate
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act48 is a U.S. health
reform law enacted in March of 2010 by former President Obama. This
law, also known as the “Affordable Care Act” or “Obamacare,” was
passed in an effort to make “affordable health insurance available to
more people.”49 In general, the ACA requires insurance and health plans
to cover recommended preventive health services without cost sharing,
copayments, deductibles, or other out-of-pocket costs.50 In 2010, the
42 See SCOTUSblog, Debrief: Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, YOUTUBE (May 8,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uvp5aoJHuM&t=1867s/.
43 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373
44 See infra Section II.A.
45 See infra Section II.B.
46 See infra Section II.C.
47 See infra Section II.D.
48 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq.).
49 Affordable
Care
Act
(ACA),
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/affordable-care-act/ (last visited May 28, 2021). See also
Women’s
Preventive
Services
Guidelines,
HEALTH
RES.
SERVS.
ADMIN.,
https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2021) (“The
Affordable Care Act . . . helps make prevention affordable and accessible for all Americans by
requiring health plans to cover preventive services and by eliminating cost sharing for those
services.”).
50 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2), 5000A(f)(2); Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373;
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696-97 (2014) (first citing 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(f)(2)), 4980H(a), (c)(2)); then citing §§ 4980D(a)–(b)) (“ACA generally requires
employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer ‘a group health plan or group health
insurance coverage’ that provides ‘minimum essential coverage . . . .’ [I]f a covered employer
provides group health insurance but its plan fails to comply with ACA’s group-health-plan

RUBIS

2021]

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR V. PENNSYLVANIA

345

Departments issued interim final rules which mainly focused on
implementing aspects of the ACA and determining what would count as
“preventive care.”51 In this original bill draft, the ACA specified three
categories of preventive care that health plans must cover. The ACA
consulted the United States Preventive Task Force, an “independent
panel of experts,” in deciding what specific preventive services should
be covered by insurers.52 These enumerated services did not include
preventive care specific to women.53
In an effort to address women’s preventive health care needs, in
2011, Former Senator Barbara Mikulski introduced the Women’s
Health Amendment (WHA), which is now codified into the ACA as
Section 300gg–13(a)(4).54 As a result of this amendment, “the
preventive health services that group health plans must cover include,
‘with respect to women,’ ‘preventive care and screenings . . . provided
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA].’”55 The statute
does not define “preventive care and screenings,” nor does it include a
list of those services.56 Through the WHA, however, Congress gave
HRSA the ability to decide what types of preventive care and screenings
must be covered in insurance plans.57
Pursuant to Section 300gg–13(a)(4), HRSA consulted the
Institute of Medicine (IOM),58 now known as the National Academy of

requirements, the employer may be required to pay $100 per day for each affected
‘individual.’”).
51 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373.
52 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 741 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53 See id.; Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2401 (2020).
54 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2401 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4)).
55 Id. Additionally, this one sentence of the federal mandate is what the Court interpreted in its
opinion. Id. at 2379-80 (majority opinion).
56 Id. at 2373 (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 697).
57 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2380. See also 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713 (2014). See
About
HRSA,
HEALTH
RESOURCES
&
SERV.
ADMIN.
(Nov.
2021),
https://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (stating that HRSA is a department dedicated to
improving “health care to people who are geographically isolated, economically or medically
vulnerable.”).
58 INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 2 (2011).
The IOM study lists several recommendations for women’s preventive healthcare needs,
including contraceptive services, and how these services would benefit women’s health and
well-being, such as avoiding unintended pregnancies, alleviating health issues, and effectively
participating in family planning. The IOM recommended that the HRSA guidelines cover all
FDA-approved contraceptive methods. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 742 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that IOM consisted of a panel of independent experts, including “specialists
in disease prevention [and] women’s health,” who prepared an extensive report evaluating “the
efficacy of a number of preventive services.”).
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Medicine,59 to determine what “preventive services are necessary for
women’s health and well-being and therefore should be considered in
the development of comprehensive guidelines for preventive services
for women.”60 After many rounds of guidance and recommendations
about the services that would be covered, in 2011, HRSA promulgated
the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines,61 which directed that
health plans include “all [FDA] approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all
women with reproductive capacity.”62 These regulations later became
known as the “contraceptive mandate.”63
Along with contraception, the 2011 guidelines encompassed
services such as well-woman visits, breastfeeding support, and annual
checkups and screenings for breast cancer, cervical cancer, postpartum
depression, and gestational diabetes as part of these recommended
preventive services.64 As a result of the WHA, “women cannot be
charged more simply because they are women, nor can they be denied
health insurance coverage because of a preexisting women’s health
condition, such as breast cancer, pregnancy, or depression.”65
Additionally, employers who do not comply with the contraceptive
mandate may face penalties, including potential fines.66

59 See generally About the National Academy of Medicine, NAT’L ACAD. MED.,
https://nam.edu/about-the-nam/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2021) (explaining that the National
Academy of Medicine (NAM) is one of three academies that comprise the National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; NAM’s overall mission is “to improve health for all
by advancing science, accelerating health equity, and providing independent, authoritative, and
trusted advice nationally and globally”).
60 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Women’s
Preventive Services Guidelines, supra note 49).
61 Id. at 2401-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines,
HRSA’s first set of guidelines, officially amended the original 2010 IFR, which mainly focused
on implementing aspects of Section 300gg-13 and determining what would count as “preventive
care services.” Id. at 2374 (majority opinion). The original 2010 IFRs did not include
contraception or women’s preventive health care services. Id. at 2401-02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). See Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, supra note 49.
62 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2402 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (2012)).
63 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373.
64 Id. at 2402 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, supra
note 49); Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, supra note 49 (“HRSA is supporting the
IOM’s recommendations on preventive services that address health needs specific to women
and fill gaps in existing guidelines.”).
65 Affordable
Care Act Improves Women’s Health, OFF. WOMEN’S HEALTH,
https://www.womenshealth.gov/30-achievements/31 (last visited Sept. 21, 2021).
66 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)-(b)). See also §§
4980H(a), (c)(1).
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B. The Promulgation of Interim Final Rules (IFRs) in an Effort to
Modify the Contraceptive Mandate and Subsequent Litigation
Around the Contraceptive Mandate
Shortly after the passage of the ACA’s contraceptive mandate,
many employers and institutions objected to providing contraception to
their employees.67 The Departments received various comments and
lawsuits from religious employers expressing their concern that the new
guidelines would infringe on their religious freedoms if they were
forced to include contraception in their health insurance plans.68
After formulating the 2011 IFR, which consisted of the
contraceptive mandate, the Departments determined that it was
permissible for HRSA to consider the views and beliefs of objecting
employers and concluded that HRSA had the discretion to create
accommodations in order to address the mandate’s effect on said
employers.69 The Departments began issuing new interim rules, but the
Departments did not create these rules pursuant to the notice and
comment rulemaking process, “which the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) often requires before an agency’s regulation can ‘have the force
and effect of law.’”70 The Departments instead followed the APA’s
good cause exception, which allows an agency to circumvent the notice
and comment process and promulgate IFRs that carry “immediate legal
force.”71
Moreover, the Departments interpreted HRSA’s discretion to
not only determine the extent to which HRSA “will provide for and
support the coverage of additional women’s preventive care and
screenings,” but also to “include the ability to exempt entities from
coverage requirements.”72 Thus, by 2012, the Departments created an
67

Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2374.
Id. See also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
69
Id. at 2374 (citing Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623).
70 Id. (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015)).
71 Id. See also JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION TO
NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 2 (2016) (“The
APA’s ‘good cause’ exception(s) thus permits agencies to issue substantive rules that bind the
public without following Section 553’s notice and comment requirement and to waive the 30day publication requirement.”).
72
Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,794 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26
68
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exemption for religious employers and established a four-part test to
identify which employers qualified under this exemption.73 This became
known as the “church exemption” because the last criterion required the
entity to “be a church, an integrated auxiliary, a convention or
association of churches, or ‘the exclusively religious activities of any
religious order.’”74 These guidelines were scheduled to go into effect in
early August of 2012 and would exempt these organizations from the
contraceptive mandate. Because this exemption narrowly applied to
churches, non-profits such as the Little Sisters could not qualify under
this exemption.75 By February 2012, in response to complaints by
certain non-profits, the Departments promulgated a final rule that
temporarily prohibited the mandate’s guidelines from applying to some
religious non-profit groups.76 Many religious employers, including the
Little Sisters, continued to file suit in the meantime.
The Departments noted that they intended to create new
additional rules to better accommodate those non-profit organizations
who could not qualify under the church exemption.77 An interim final
rule was then created in 2013 by the Departments, which became known
as the “self-certification accommodation” process.78 Here, the
Departments re-defined what “religious employer” meant under the
C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (explaining that “because the text refers to
Guidelines ‘supported by HRSA for purposes of this paragraph,’ the Departments have
consistently interpreted that authority to afford HRSA broad discretion to consider the
requirements of coverage and cost-sharing in determining the nature and extent of preventive
care and screenings recommended in the guidelines”).
73 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2374.
74 Id. See generally Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,871 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510,
2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (outlining the criteria for the “church exemption” rule, stating
that the 2011 IFR explained that “a religious employer is one that: (1) Has the inculcation of
religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3)
primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a nonprofit organization
described in section 6033(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code”).
75 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2374 (citing Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725-26 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147)). See also Lara Cartwright-Smith & Sara Rosenbaum, Controversy, Contraception, and
Conscience: Insurance Coverage Standards Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 127 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 541, 542 (2012).
76 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2374. Until that rule was created, the 2012 rule offered
a temporary safeguard to protect the aforementioned non-exempted employers. This safe harbor
protected non-profits “whose plans have consistently not covered all or the same subset of
contraceptive services” due to religious reasons. Id. at 2374-75.
77 Id. at 2374 (citing Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at
8727).
78 Id. at 2375.

RUBIS

2021]

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR V. PENNSYLVANIA

349

accommodation.79 These new regulations defined religious
organizations as organizations that “(1) [o]ppos[e] providing coverage
for some or all of the contraceptive services . . . on account of religious
objections; (2) [are] organized and operat[e] as . . . nonprofit entit[ies];
(3) hol[d] [themselves] out as . . . religious organization[s]; and (4) selfcertif[y] that [they] satisf[y] the first three criteria.”80 This
accommodation process required an eligible organization to self-certify
to HHS, their health insurance providers, or third-party administrators
of their religious objections to contraception by providing “a copy of the
self-certification form,” which then “would exclude contraceptive
coverage from the group health plan and provide payments to
beneficiaries for contraceptive services separate from the health plan.”81
Therefore, under this accommodation, employees would be given
separate payments for contraception through their insurance or the thirdparty provider without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the
employer, its insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. 82 Thus,
religious employers would no longer be obligated to purchase
contraceptive coverage and did not have to “contract, arrange, pay, or
refer for contraceptive coverage.”83 This process was specifically
created to protect religious organizations while still ensuring that
women had access to contraceptive services.
However, while some employers were satisfied with the
accommodation, many religious employers, such as the Little Sisters,
continued to oppose the new accommodation process as a violation of
their religious beliefs. The Little Sisters challenged the self-certification
accommodation, arguing that completing this certification form “would
force them to violate their religious beliefs by ‘tak[ing] actions that
directly cause others to provide contraception or appear to participate in

79

Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874) (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156)).
81 Id. at 2375 (citing Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,878).
82 See id. (reasoning that the Departments had stated in the past that the accommodation sought
to “‘protec[t]’ religious organizations ‘from having to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for
[contraceptive] coverage’ in a way that was consistent with and did not violate the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)”); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. 682, 682-83 (2014).
83 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2375. See also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 699 (citing
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at
39,877).
80
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the Department’s delivery scheme.’”84 By participating in the
accommodation process, the Little Sisters argued that notifying their
insurance or the government effectively triggers the coverage of their
employees by someone else, which the Little Sisters believe makes them
complicit in providing contraception.85 While the Little Sisters
continued litigating, other lawsuits regarding the contraceptive mandate
made their way to the Supreme Court.
C. The History and Outcome of Precedent Cases and the
Departments’ Attempt at Complying with These Decisions
By 2013, many employers brought suits challenging the
accommodation process and the contraceptive mandate itself, including
the Little Sisters. In the 2014 case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 86 the Supreme Court held that under the RFRA, closely held forprofit corporations were entitled to invoke the exemption if they had
sincerely held religious objections to contraceptive coverage.87
The respondents in Hobby Lobby, owners of three closely held
for-profit corporations,88 opposed four methods of contraception that
were covered by the contraceptive mandate.89 Based on the respondents’
individual Christian beliefs, such as the belief that life begins at
84 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2376 (alteration in original) (citing Little Sisters of
the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis
added)).
85 See Debrief: Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, supra note 42; see also Little Sisters
of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2391 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The inescapable bottom line is that the
accommodation demanded that parties like the Little Sisters engage in conduct that was a
necessary cause of the ultimate conduct to which they had strong religious objections.”).
86 573 U.S. 682 (“The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the
‘Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability’ unless the Government ‘demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.’” (alteration in original) (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-1(a)-(b))). HHS and the dissent in Hobby Lobby made several arguments to demonstrate
that a for-profit corporation cannot “engage in the ‘exercise of religion’ within the meaning of
RFRA.” Id. at 713. The majority disagreed, however, citing various reasons for its holding, such
as corporations being treated as “individuals” for RFRA purposes. Id. at 707-09.
87 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2383 (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 723-24).
88 This case involved two families who owned companies; the Greens own the nationwide chain
Hobby Lobby and the Hahns own Conestoga Wood Specialties. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at
700-02. Hobby Lobby is a privately held arts and crafts company owned by Evangelical
Christians with more than 500 stores around the United States. Id. at 702. One of the Greens’
sons also had an affiliated business called Mardel, which “operates 35 Christian bookstores and
employs close to 400 people.” Id. All of these companies are organized as for-profit
corporations. Id. at 700, 702.
89 Id. at 701-03.
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conception, the respondents opposed providing certain methods of
contraception to employees because the respondents believed it would
make them “complicit in abortion.”90 Thus, the respondents maintained
that the mandate substantially burdened their free exercise and sought
exemption from the contraceptive mandate as to the four objectionable
contraceptive methods.91
The Court reasoned that the mandate substantially burdened the
free exercise of for-profit corporations in forcing them to provide their
employees with these contraceptive methods.92 The Court also held that
the contraceptive mandate did not utilize the least restrictive means of
serving a compelling governmental interest, stating that the selfcertification accommodation was “a less burdensome alternative.”93 As
a result, these companies could not be required to provide contraceptive
coverage.
Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, the Court decided that an
entity (in this case, a college) seeking an exemption did not need to file
the accommodation form.94 Rather, the entity’s notification to HHS was
sufficient to receive the exemption. The Departments then promulgated
a final rule in compliance with these rulings. Later, in Zubik v.
Burwell,95 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the selfcertification accommodation, in which employers argued that
submitting the self-certification accommodation notice still constituted
a substantial burden to the exercise of their religion.96 The Court vacated
and remanded the cases without deciding the RFRA question and
resolving the legal issue.97 Instead, the Court directed the parties “to
attempt to come to an agreement.”98 Because all parties here had
accepted that an alternative approach was feasible, the Court directed
90 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691, 720). The
respondents challenged on the grounds that the mandate violated the RFRA, stating that “[i]f
the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating abortions, and
if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy price.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691. In
Hobby Lobby, the employers opposed four methods of contraception that “may have the effect
of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment
to the uterus,” such as emergency contraception and the “morning after pill,” methods that they
believed constituted early abortion. Id. at 697-702.
91 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
92 Id. at 2370.
93 Id. at 2377 (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730-31).
94 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
95 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
96 Id. at 1559.
97 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2388 (Alito, J., concurring).
98 Id.
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the government to “accommodat[e] petitioners’ religious exercise while
at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health
plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive
coverage.”99
After these decisions, the Departments initiated the task of
reformulating rules regarding the contraceptive mandate.100 The
Departments reformulated the rules both under Zubik’s direction to
accommodate religious employers, but also “against the backdrop of
Hobby Lobby’s pronouncement that the mandate, standing alone,
violated RFRA as applied to all religious entities with complicity-based
objections.”101 In 2016, the Departments ultimately decided that “no
feasible approach” had been identified to comply with Zubik, the
government could not find a way to sufficiently accommodate both
parties.102
D. Two Broad Exemptions Created in Light of Hobby Lobby and
Zubik
In 2017, the Departments again tried to comply with Zubik by
promulgating the final rules that served as the motivation behind the
Little Sisters litigation. The Departments carved out two broad
exemptions for those employers who objected to the mandate on
religious or moral grounds.103 The exemptions extended to non-profit as
well as for-profit employers, including publicly traded companies.104
The religious exemption ultimately expanded the original
church exemption to include employers who object to the mandate
99

Id. at 2376 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (citing Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560). The
Departments maintained that the self-certification accommodation was consistent with the
RFRA “because it did not impose a substantial burden, and even if it did, it utilized the least
restrictive means of achieving the Government’s interests.” However, after the case was
remanded, the Departments attempted to create rules that complied with both Hobby Lobby and
Zubik. Id. at 2377.
100 Id.
101
Id.
102 Id. The Little Sisters and other religious employers continued to object to participating in
any behavior that would result in their employees obtaining contraception under their insurance
plans, and the Departments maintained that there was no other way of providing contraceptive
coverage to employees without using the employer’s plan, issuer, or third-party administrator.
Id. (Alito, J., concurring). See also Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536, 57,545-46
(Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
103 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
104 Id. The self-certification accommodation is still optional under the Court’s decision, but
employers do not have to utilize the accommodation, meaning they can be exempted altogether
if they hold “sincerely held religious or moral beliefs.” Id. at 2399-2400 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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“based on its sincerely held religious beliefs.”105 Because these
employers were exempt, they did not have to use the accommodation
process, which was still available under the new exemptions.106 As with
the prior IFRs, the Departments again invoked Section 300gg–13(a)(4)
as authority to promulgate the “religious exemption.”107 The
Departments maintained that Section 300gg–13(a)(4) included the
ability to exempt entities from coverage requirements.108 The
Departments further maintained that RFRA “compelled the creation of,
or at least provided the discretion to create, the religious exemption.”109
The Departments believed that the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby
extends “for the purposes of analyzing a substantial burden,” which
includes the burdens that an entity would face in “participating in the
self-certification accommodation process.”110
The second rule created a moral exemption for employers who
objected on moral grounds “to providing some or all forms of
contraceptive coverage.”111 This exemption also extended to non-profits
and for-profits with no publicly traded components.112 The Departments
invoked their authority under the ACA to create the moral exemption as
well.113 As a result, the broad exemptions allow any employer or entity

105

Id. at 2370 (majority opinion). See also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2021).
Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Religious Exemptions and
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,806 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590,
45 C.F.R. pt. 147)).
107 Id. (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,794).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 2377 (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,800-06). The
Departments explained: “We know from Hobby Lobby that, in the absence of any
accommodation, the contraceptive-coverage requirement imposes a substantial burden on
certain objecting employers. We know from other lawsuits and public comments that many
religious entities have objections to complying with the [self-certification] accommodation
based on their sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id. at 2377-78 (citing Religious Exemptions and
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
82 Fed. Reg. at 47,806).
110
Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2378 (citing Religious Exemptions and
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
82 Fed. Reg. at 47,800).
111 Id.
112
Id.
113 Id. (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,844).
106
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with religious or moral beliefs to completely opt out of the contraceptive
mandate.114
III.

COURT’S REASONING

The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s judgment and
remanded the case with instructions to end the nationwide preliminary
injunction.115 The Court determined whether the ACA permits the
federal government to create rules exempting employers who hold
religious or moral beliefs from providing contraceptive coverage in their
employee health plans. The Court specifically addressed two issues: (1)
whether the Departments had the statutory authority under the ACA to
promulgate the exemptions, and (2) whether the Departments
procedurally complied with federal laws governing the administrative
agency rulemaking process when promulgating the exemptions.116 The
Court found that the two exemptions were substantively and
procedurally valid, holding that the Departments had the authority
pursuant to the ACA to create the religious and moral blanket
exemptions from the contraceptive mandate and that the Departments
also complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)
procedural requirements.117 In a footnote, the majority also held that the
Little Sisters had standing in this case.118 The Court also found that the
ACA gave the Departments the authority to promulgate these rules, so
the Court did not consider the issue of whether RFRA required or
authorized the exceptions.119 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas believes that
“that the contraceptive mandate is capable of violating RFRA.”120

114

Id. (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,802, 47,810-11, 47,850, 47,86162).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2379, 2384.
117 Id. at 2386.
118 Id. at 2379 n.6.
119 Id. at 2382.
120 Id. at 2383. See also Affordable Care Act — Contraceptive Mandate — Religious
Exemptions — Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 560, 563 (2020) (citing Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2383) (discussing Justice
Thomas’ rejection of the states’ claims that the agencies could not consider RFRA when
formulating the religious exemption because RFRA applies to all Federal law unless Congress
explicitly excluded a statute from RFRA’s reach)).
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Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with
the Departments,121 and used the plain language of the statute to reject
the states’ claims.122 The issue turned on an interpretation of what
exactly HRSA can “provide for.”123 The Court interpreted “as provided
for” in the statute to be a broad grant of authority and discretion to
determine what counts as preventive care and screenings.124 Justice
Thomas writes: “On its face . . . the provision grants sweeping authority
to HRSA to craft a set of standards defining the preventive care that
applicable health plans must cover.”125 Justice Thomas further supports
his decision by reasoning that the statute does not contain “an exhaustive
or illustrative list of the preventive care and screenings” and is silent as
to what the comprehensive guidelines must contain or how HRSA must
create them.126 Thus, Thomas writes, this same authority that empowers
HRSA to decide what preventive care to include also “include[es] the
ability for HRSA to identify and craft exemptions from its own
Guidelines.”127 The Court further reasons in a footnote that the Court’s
decisions in Hobby Lobby and Zubik support the idea that the ACA
statute empowered HRSA to create the exemptions since the
Departments had the authority to create the initial church exemption as
well as the 2013 self-certification accommodation.128
As for the second issue, the Court ruled that the Trump
administration met the procedural requirements outlined in the APA

121 The Departments argued that the phrase “as provided for” permits HRSA “to identify what
preventive care and screenings must be covered and to exempt or accommodate certain
employers’ religious objections.” Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing Religious
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 83 FR 57,536, 57,540-41 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)). The Departments also maintained that such as with the
Church exemption, “their role as the administering agencies permits them to guide HRSA in its
discretion . . .”. Id. (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,794 (Oct. 13, 2017)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)).
122 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2380. The States, on the other hand, argued that
Section 300gg-13(a)(4) of the ACA allowed HRSA “to only list the preventive care and
screenings that health plans ‘shall . . . provide,’ not to exempt entities from covering those
identified services.” Id.
123 Id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 2379-80 (majority opinion).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2380.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2381 n.7. The Court explains that “it would be passing strange for this Court to direct
the Departments to make such an accommodation if it thought the ACA did not authorize
one.” Id.
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when enacting the two exemptions.129 The Court found that the
Departments had not violated the APA’s procedural requirements. The
states argued that the rulemaking procedure for the exemptions was
defective because the Departments named the relevant document
“Interim Final Rules with Request for Comments” instead of “General
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.”130 The Court, however, ruled that the
2017 IFR’s request for comments “readily satisfied the APA notice
requirements,”131 as the request explained the Departments’ view that
they had authority both under the ACA and under the RFRA to
promulgate the exemptions.132 Thus, Justice Thomas opined that the
exemptions “contained all of the elements of a notice of proposed
rulemaking as required by the APA.”133 The Court went on to say that
even if the Departments were required to publish a document called
“notice of proposed rulemaking,” there was no “prejudicial error.”134
Additionally, Justice Thomas rejected the “open-mindedness
test” argued by the Respondents and upheld by the Third Circuit.135
Justice Thomas notes that the “open-mindedness” test has “no basis in
the APA,” and instead, focused on the APA’s objective criteria.136 Thus,
the Court held that each of the APA’s procedural requirements was
satisfied: The Departments “‘request[ed] and encourage[ed] public
comments on all matters addressed’ in the rules;” the Departments
“gave interested parties 60 days to submit comments;” the final rules
contained a “concise statement on their basis and purpose;” and the final

129

Id. at 2384.
Id.
131 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)) (“[T]he APA requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register before promulgating a rule that has legal force.”). See also
id. at 2384 (citing §§ 553(b)(2)-(3)).
132 Id. at 2384 (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,794, 47,844,
47,800-06 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R pt. 54, 29 C.F.R pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R pt. 147)).
Justice Thomas maintained that the Departments issued an IFR that discussed “its position in
fulsome detail and ‘provide[d] the public with an opportunity to comment on whether [the]
regulations . . . should be permanent or subject to modification’”). Id. (citing Religious
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,815, 47,852, 47,855).
133 Id. at 2384.
134 Id. at 2385.
135 Id. Respondents argued that the final rules made small changes to the IFRs, “leaving their
substance unchanged.” Id. The Third Circuit also used this test, maintaining that the final rules
were “‘virtually identical’ to the IFRs” and thus, the Departments did not have the “requisite
‘flexible and open-minded attitude’ when they promulgated the final rules.” Id. (citing
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 569 (3d Cir. 2019)).
136 Id. at 2385-86 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990)).
130
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rules were published in November 2018 and became effective in
January 2019, “more than 30 days after being published.”137
Justice Alito concurred with the Court’s decision, reasoning that
the Court should have gone further and should have ruled that the
exemptions were valid under RFRA.138 He stated: “RFRA compels an
exemption for the Little Sisters and any other employer” to the mandate,
and thus, would hold that the exemptions are not arbitrary and
capricious for this reason.139 Furthermore, Justice Alito believes that
requiring religious employers to comply with the mandate would violate
the RFRA and impose a substantial burden on employers since the Little
Sisters “have a sincere religious objection to the use of contraceptives
and [they] also have a sincere religious belief that utilizing the
accommodation would make them complicit in this conduct.”140 Lastly,
Justice Alito maintained that there are many exceptions in the ACA
that already exclude many people from the contraceptive mandate
(such as excluding those working for employers with fifty employees
or less or those who do not work outside of the home); that Congress
did not mandate coverage in the ACA itself but left it to the
government to decide; and that ensuring women have access to
seamless no-cost contraception is not a compelling governmental
interest, and even if it were, the mandate was not the “least restrictive
means” of carrying this interest out.141
Justice Kagan also offered a concurring opinion, maintaining
that the ACA’s language granting HRSA’s authority was ambiguous.142
Justice Kagan reasoned that it is difficult to determine what Congress
intended, and thus, the Chevron Doctrine should apply, which “instructs
that a court facing statutory ambiguity should accede to a reasonable
interpretation by the implementing agency.”143 She further maintained
137

Id. at 2386 (citing Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,813, 47,854, 47,792,
47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R pt. 54, 29 C.F.R pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R pt. 147); Moral
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 83 FR 57,592, 57,537-38 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)).
138 Id. at 2387 (Alito, J., concurring).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2390.
141 Id. at 2393-94.
142 Id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 2397 (“Sometimes when I squint, I read the law as giving HRSA discretion over all
coverage issues . . . At other times, I see the statute as putting the agency in charge of only the
‘what’ question, and not the ‘who.’”). See generally VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE,
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that Chevron should be used because “the agency’s expertise often
enables a sounder assessment of which reading best fits the statutory
scheme.”144 However, even with this reading, Justice Kagan questioned
whether the exemptions are arbitrary and capricious and would have
remanded for the lower courts to decide on this issue.145
Justice Ginsburg offered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Sotomayor, focusing on the impact that the Court’s ruling will have on
women in the long term. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the Court
reached the wrong conclusion.146 First, she maintained that the plain
language of the ACA authorizes HRSA to decide only the “type” of
women’s health services, not to carve out exemptions and ultimately
undermine the statutory directive to produce those services at a
minimum.147 Justice Ginsburg also found that the exemptions were not
required nor authorized by RFRA.148 Justice Ginsburg recognized that
religious accommodations and exemptions may be carved out to cure
violations of RFRA, but only to the extent that they do not substantially
burden nonbeneficiaries.149 Based on the concerns for women
employees, their dependents, and students, Justice Ginsburg concluded
the Court should have come to a different conclusion.
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The Court Failed to Adequately Weigh the Exemptions’ Harm
to Women Employees
While the Court did not deny that women would be adversely
impacted by the broad religious and moral exemptions, the Court
nevertheless upheld the exemptions to the detriment of women
employees across the country. As Justice Ginsburg noted, “the Court
casts totally aside countervailing rights and interests in its zeal to secure
CHEVRON DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 1, 5 (CONG. RES. SERV. 2017) (stating that much deference is
captured in the APA and afforded to agencies when they are interpreting their governing
statutes; the Chevron Doctrine specifies that if the court finds that the statute is silent or
ambiguous regarding the specific issue, the reviewing court must consider whether the agency’s
action was based on a permissible or reasonable interpretation of the statute at issue).
144 Id. at 2397 (citing Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984)).
145 Id. at 2399. See infra Section IV.C.
146 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 2405 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (stating that “[A] group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a
minimum provide . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
148 Id. at 2409.
149 Id. at 2407.
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religious rights to the nth degree.”150 The Court failed to effectively
analyze how it can respect the beliefs of religious employers while
protecting employees who do not share in those beliefs, and the Court
should have adequately balanced these two rights.
The Court’s holding will ultimately result in many women
losing access to no-cost contraception through their health insurance
plans. It is reported that “more than 2.9 million Americans – including
approximately 580,000 women of childbearing age – receive insurance
through organizations newly eligible for the Court’s blanket
exemptions.”151 The government also estimates that “between 70,500
and 126,400 women of childbearing age . . . will experience the
disappearance of the contraceptive coverage formerly available to
them,” and “the numbers may be even higher.”152 Accordingly, the
Court’s decision will impact thousands of women in this country,
specifically in terms of the adverse impact on women’s overall health
and well-being; their social and economic status; and their ability to
function fully as citizens in democratic society, particularly as full and
equal members of the market and labor force.
In general, courts have moved away from looking at adverse
impact as a way to establish a constitutional claim. The Court typically
wants to see animus and intentional discrimination on the party’s part.153
150

Id. at 2400.
Id. at 2403 (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,577-78 (Nov. 15, 2018)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)). See also Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (writing that
“[T]housands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons
those corporations employ” are affected by the Court’s decision).
152 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2408 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 83 Fed. Reg.
57578–57580). See also Contraceptive Use in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct.
2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/fb_contr_use.pdf (stating birth
control is used nearly universally by women of reproductive age in the United States); The
Affordable Care Act’s Birth Control Benefit: Too Important to Lose Fact Sheet, NAT’L
WOMEN’S L. CTR. (May 2017), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BC-BenefitWhats-At-Stake.pdf (citing PERRYUNDEM, CONTRACEPTIVES + POLICY THROUGH A GENDER
LENS, RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 17 (2017)) (reporting that women are consistently
using their insurance coverage to access contraceptive services and a 2017 poll found that over
seventy-seven percent of women want the birth control benefit to continue).
153 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“Title VII prohibits both intentional
discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not
intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities
(known as ‘disparate impact’)”); see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32
(1971) (holding Title VII’s purpose was to prohibit employment discrimination and thus barred
both intentional discrimination in employment as well as unintended disparate impact resulting
from employment policies); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); City of
151
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Thus, disparate impact analysis and third-party harm analysis based on
race and sex have been on the wane for some time now.154 However, the
Court, as articulated in several other cases, is extremely deferential to
religious groups in determining whether they hold sincerely held
religious beliefs, usually finding that those views are reasonable.155
Overall, as it is currently composed, the Court continues to favor and
sympathize with religious liberty over other rights, often to the
detriment of others.
For example, in many of the cases regarding the re-opening of
churches during the Covid-19 global pandemic, the Court has been
highly deferential to churches and houses of worship, partially relying
on adverse impact when deciding these cases. South Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom156 and Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo157 deal with the issue of whether state regulations
that restrict attendance at churches and religious services should be
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (upholding a policy that had adverse
impacts on Black applicants because racially disparate impact is not enough to say there is
discriminatory purpose; the Court found a legitimate governmental interest in policy, so
pursuing that policy in spite of adverse impact to achieve some other benign objective was
permissible); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (holding that the
policy at issue was upheld despite it disproportionately favoring men over women because there
was no intent or discriminatory purpose in favoring men, but rather the purpose was to benefit
veterans in terms of availability of employment opportunities, and adverse impact on women
was incidental to that purpose); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 140 S. Ct.
1891, 1916 (2020) (holding that former President Trump’s negative comments towards
immigrants and Latinos “fail to raise a plausible inference that the recission [of DACA] was
motivated by animus,” as they were made “remote in time and [in] unrelated contexts”).
154 See Reframing the Harm: Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harm After Little Sisters,
134 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2187 (2021) (“The Court will find a compelling governmental interest
only in preventing a circumscribed range of harms that the Court has previously recognized as
especially suspect.”).
155 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Thomas v. Rev. Bd.
of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause
required a state to provide unemployment compensation benefits to employee who quit his job
due to his belief that his religion forbade him from participating in the line of work of producing
weapons); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731
(2018); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021).
156 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021). This challenge was brought by a California church which sought a
lower court order allowing it to hold in-person services, despite a state-wide order requiring
places of worship to hold services virtually/online to prevent the spread of the Coronavirus. The
State’s order forbade “any kind of indoor worship.” Id. at 717.
157 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (granting preliminary injunction and enjoining the Governor’s
restrictions on religious services because applicants showed likelihood of succeeding on First
Amendment claims, and because denying relief would lead to irreparable harm while granting
such relief would not harm public interest). The Court stated that the state’s regulations resulted
in disparate treatment against churches and that “the regulations cannot be viewed as neutral
because they single out houses of worship for especially harsh treatment.” Id. at 66.
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suspended. The Court sided with the church in both cases, reasoning
that the states cannot enforce the complete prohibition on indoor
worship services.158 Many of the Justices on the Court, however, would
have forced the states to reopen churches at greater or full capacity,
relying on the adverse impact that state policies may have on
worshippers and churchgoers.159
Moreover, although religion is at the core of many cases like
Hobby Lobby, the majority does not discuss third-party harms under the
Establishment Clause in Little Sisters. The third-party harm principle
stands for the proposition that although the government “may
‘accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements,’ when it
does so, it may not benefit religious adherents at the expense of the
rights of third parties.”160 In several cases, the Court has upheld or
granted religious accommodations, “but only insofar as they did not
impose too heavy a burden on unwitting third parties.”161
158

Newsom, 141 S. Ct. at 716; Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 63.
See Newsom, 141 S. Ct. at 716. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch would grant the
application in full. See id. at 719-20 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“California singles out
religion . . . . In my view, the State must do more to tailor the requirements of public health to
the rights of its people.”). But see id. at 720 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Court orders California
to weaken its restrictions on public gatherings by making a special exception for worship
services. The majority does so even though the State’s policies treat worship just as favorably
as secular activities that . . . pose the same risk of COVID transmission”.).
160 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2408
(2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (holding
that courts must take “adequate account” of “the burdens a requested accommodation may
impose on nonbeneficiaries”)). See also Brief for the Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (Nos.
19-431, 19-454); Reframing the Harm, supra note 154 at 2186 (citing Douglas NeJaime & Reva
B. Siegel, Religious Accommodation, and Its Limits, in a Pluralist Society, in RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 69, 74 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019)).
161 Affordable Care Act — Contraceptive Mandate, supra note 120, at 560. Whether granting
or denying exemptions, the Court had frequently considered third-party harms in its analysis.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (creating an exemption for a Seventh-day
Adventist employee to obtain unemployment benefits despite rejecting jobs that required her to
work on her Sabbath, utilizing a third-party harm analysis and recognizing that such an
exemption would not “abridge any other person’s religious liberties”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 224 (1972) (upholding a religious exemption that permitted Amish parents to remove
their children from school so long as their children were not harmed by the exemption,
explaining that the exemption interfered “with no rights or interests of others”); United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (denying exemption to Amish employer because “granting an
exemption from social security taxes . . . operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on
the employees”); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating a state
law that that allows workers the right not to work on their Sabbath because the law had
disregarded the effect it would have on employers and other employees); Cutter, 544 U.S. at
159
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The Court considered third-party harms in Hobby Lobby and
Zubik, two precedent cases to Little Sisters.162 The holdings of Hobby
Lobby and Zubik turned on the fact that women employees would not
be impacted by the accommodation and would continue to have
seamless access to cost-free contraceptive coverage.163 The Court
should have used the third-party harm analysis under the Establishment
Clause that it had committed to in prior cases, especially in light of the
fact that the new exemptions will have far reaching implications on
hundreds of thousands of women employees, which is “exactly the type
of consequence that recognizing third-party harms was intended to
guard against.”164 But the Court departed from this approach, signaling
that third-party harms “will no longer serve as a check on” the
accommodations at issue in Little Sisters.165
Justice Thomas rejected a third-party harm consideration, stating
that whether women would be impacted was a policy concern that
“cannot justify supplanting the text’s plain meaning” and is a concern
better suited for Congress.166 Justice Thomas diverges from a long
history of third-party harm precedent, without coming to any
conclusions about RFRA in the majority opinion. This comes as no
710 (“An accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant
interests.”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014) (granting a religious
exemption only insofar as the accommodation would have no effect on female employees).
162 Affordable Care Act — Contraceptive Mandate, supra note 120, at 567 (“[T]he Court
abandoned the balance it struck in Hobby Lobby and abstained from the third-party harm
analysis that has long shaped its religious accommodation jurisprudence.”).
163 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2407 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women
employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would be
precisely zero.”); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (stating that the
government had to ensure that not only were objecting employers’ needs met, it must also
ensure that women covered by petitioners’ health plans “receive full and equal health
coverage, including contraceptive coverage”).
164 Affordable Care Act — Contraceptive Mandate, supra note 120, at 567-68.
165 Id. at 565 (“By allowing the exemptions to stand without even a discussion of negative
externalities, the Court . . . implicitly undermined a doctrine of third-party harms that has long
provided a limiting principle in cases where religious freedom and other rights clash.”). But see
Gene Schaerr & Michael Worley, The “Third Party Harm Rule”: Law or Wishful Thinking?,
17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 641 (2019) (explaining that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
“rejected Establishment Clause challenges to religious exemptions of any kind” and successful
challenges fail to provide “for a general ‘rule against third-party harms’”).
166 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2381. Justice Thomas defends religion in a way that
is not extended to women’s health care coverage, writing: “[T]he Little Sisters have engaged in
faithful service and sacrifice . . . But for the past seven years, they . . . have had to fight for the
ability to continue in their noble work without violating their sincerely held religious beliefs.”
Id. at 2386. In Justice Thomas’ majority opinion, which was over 4,000 words, the words
“women” and “woman” are only mentioned seven times, even though the statute that was being
analyzed by the Court contained the word “women” within the text itself. Id. at 2367-88.
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surprise since Justice Thomas is not inclined to give much weight to
precedent decisions.167 Furthermore, Justice Alito also fails to analyze
the third-party harm principle under RFRA, which is nevertheless
“subject to the limits” of the Establishment Clause.168 Justice Alito
maintains that there was no “burden” on those employees no longer able
to obtain contraception through the mandate because those employees
were “simply not the beneficiar[ies] of something that federal law does
not provide,” yet he concurrently recognized that there would be
employees who would be burdened by the exemptions.169
He further contradicts himself when he discusses the financial
burden to employers if they do not comply with the mandate, stating,
“[W]e found these ‘severe’ financial consequences sufficient to show
that the practical effect of non-compliance would be ‘substantial,’” yet
altogether excludes a discussion of the financial burden women would
incur if no longer provided with cost-free services under the mandate.170
See Jeremy Rozansky, Precedent and the Conservative Court, 46 NAT’L AFFS. 34 (2021),
https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/precedent-and-the-conservative-test; Jonathan
Stempel, Justice Thomas urges U.S. Supreme Court to feel free to reverse precedents, REUTERS
(June 17, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-thomasidUSKCN1TI2KJ (writing that Justice Thomas “has long expressed a greater willingness than
his colleagues to overrule precedents”); Tom Goldstein, Justice Thomas and Constitutional
“Stare
Indecisis,”
SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct.
8,
2007,
4:42
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2007/10/justice-thomas-and-constitutional-stare-indecisis/
(opining that Justice Thomas “thinks that, in the field of constitutional law, precedent is not
entitled to any weight”).
168 Reframing the Harm, supra note 154 (citing Brief for the Church-State Scholars, supra note
160, at 2367). See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion,
49 HARV. CIV. RTS-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 343, 347 (2014) (“RFRA's compliance with the
Establishment Clause is [a] threshold requirement not unlike subject matter jurisdiction.”).
169 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2396 (Alito, J., concurring). See also Reframing the
Harm, supra note 154, at 2188 (stating that conservative justices on the Court have shifted their
view of a third-party harm analysis from one that was a framework of general applicability to
one that “asks whether the harm is one that implicates a constitutionally protected” right).
170 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2390 (Alito, J., concurring). See generally Brief for
National Women’s Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15-16, Little
Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (No. 19-454, 19-431) (citing Adam
Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies Without
Cost-Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7, 10 (2011) (finding that the cost of contraception
without insurance coverage is significant and that “cost is a major determinant of whether people
obtain contraceptive care”)); GENERATION PROGRESS & ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, PROTECTING
BIRTH
CONTROL
COVERAGE
FOR
YOUNG
PEOPLE
1
(2015),
https://www.advocatesforyouth.org/wpcontent/uploads/storage/advfy/documents/Factsheets/protecting%20birth%20control%20cover
age%20factsheet-2-18-15.pdf (reporting that prior to ACA’s enactment more than fifty-five
percent of young women said they experienced a time when they could not afford contraception
167
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Additionally, while Justice Alito in Hobby Lobby stated that “racially
discriminatory religious exemptions would never be permissible,”171 as
he has maintained in other cases, he fails to consider how the Court’s
decision would disproportionately and distinctly impact women of
color.172 The views of Justices Thomas and Alito appear in other cases
as well, and the minute attention given to women and women’s health
concerns continue to permeate in both written opinion and oral
arguments.173
Ultimately, Justice Alito and other conservative Justices did not
weigh women’s rights and reproductive rights as strongly as religious
rights because they are not text-based. Because Little Sisters deals with
the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause, which is found in
the Constitution, textualists like Justice Gorsuch or originalists like
Justice Thomas would find that protecting religious rights, as in this
case, is a vibrant constitutional interest that weighs heavily. On the other
hand, the right to access contraception is not, since that right is derived
from a privacy right, which many Justices do not think exists in the
Constitution.174 The overall deference given to religion signals that the
current Court is developing First Amendment Free Exercise

consistently); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 742 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Women paid significantly more than men for preventive care . . . cost barriers
operated to block many women from obtaining needed care at all.”); 155 CONG. REC. 28837,
28844 (2009) (“When [women] had to choose between feeding their children, paying the rent,
and meeting other financial obligations, they skipped important preventive screenings and took
a chance with their personal health.”).
171 Reframing the Harm, supra note 154, at 2196 (“Justice Alito in Hobby Lobby explicitly
stated that racially discriminatory religious exemptions would never be permissible . . . .While
the Court did not offer similar assurance in Little Sisters, there is also no evidence that the
conservative Justices have changed their minds on this point.”).
172 See Brief for Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., et al., supra note 170, at 12-14 (stating that women of
color will be particularly harmed by the exemptions and the exemptions will further exacerbate
health disparities); Brief for Howard University School of Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (Nos. 19454, 19-431) (explaining that the exemptions “build[] upon the various barriers that already
face African-American women seeking to avail themselves of comprehensive health care and,
thus, threatens to exacerbate existing disparities”).
173 See, e.g., RACHEL VANSICKLE-WARD & KEVIN WALLSTEN, THE POLITICS OF THE P ILL, 90
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2019). In the Hobby Lobby opinion, the focus was framed around
religious liberty, and the mentions of “religion” and “religious” far outweighed mentions of
“women” and “woman.” Id. at 91. Statements made concerning religion constituted 39% of
the opinion, and statements made concerning economics were 44%, while reproductive and
women’s rights-related statements constituted a total of 3%. Id.
174 See Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2396 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Jurisprudence that is increasing, concerning, and largely exclusive of
third-party harm considerations.175
All in all, assuming the ACA permits reasonable
accommodations to be carved out pursuant to administrative or
regulatory practices, a meaningful limitation should nevertheless be
implemented when third parties are harmed. The harm to women
employees and their dependents under their employee health plans
should place a restriction on the government’s ability to create these
broad exemptions.176 And while the Court did not consider a disparate
impact analysis or undue burden analysis177, this remains an open
question for the women employees affected by Little Sisters.178 The
Court has visited similar issues in the past, particularly regarding
whether the Rehabilitation Act, and by extension the ACA, “provides a
disparate-impact cause of action for plaintiffs alleging disability

175 See Constitutional Constraints on Free Exercise Analogies, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1782, 1784
(2021); Steven K. Green, How the Supreme Court Found Its Faith and Put ‘Religious Liberty’
on a Winning Streak, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 13, 2021, 8:38 AM),
https://theconversation.com/how-the-supreme-court-found-its-faith-and-put-religious-libertyon-a-winning-streak-158509.
176 Debrief: Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, supra note 42.
177 See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUST ., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL § VII, at 2 (2021) (“While a
discriminatory impact or effect may also be evidence of intentional discrimination or disparate
treatment, this section discusses disparate impact as a cause of action independent of any
intent.”); Michael C. Harper, Confusion on the Court: Distinguishing Disparate Treatment
from Disparate Impact in Young v. UPS and EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 96 B.U. L.
REV. 543, 543 (2016) (highlighting the difference between disparate impact and disparate
treatment). Although many civil rights laws do not in themselves have disparate impact
provisions, the government may nevertheless make these claims. Similarly, an undue burden
analysis has been utilized in other contexts outside of the abortion line of cases, such as voting
rights or Second Amendment cases. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 55, McCoy v. Desantis,
No. 20-12304 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2020) (arguing that the court should have applied an undue
burden standard when analyzing Appellant’s gender-based claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment and Nineteenth Amendment); The Anderson-Burdick Doctrine: Balancing the
Benefits and Burdens of Voting Restrictions, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/election-law-explainers/the-anderson-burdick-doctrinebalancing-the-benefits-and-burdens-of-voting-restrictions/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2022)
(discussing the Anderson-Burdick line of cases which “requires courts to weigh burdens that a
state imposes on electoral participation against the state’s asserted benefits”); Nordyke v.
King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying a substantial burden analysis to the Second
Amendment right to bear arms).
178 See Zach Smith et al., Little Sisters of Poor Win Big at Supreme Court, but Fight Isn’t Over,
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 9, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/commentary/littlesisters-poor-win-big-supreme-court-fight-isnt-over. It could also be argued that other alternative
practices would have a significantly less disparate impact on women. See supra Section IV.B.i.
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discrimination,”179 which could signify that Little Sisters and its
discriminatory effect may be revisited in the near future after all.
B. The Court Should Have Adhered to Legal Precedent and Given
Greater Weight to the Women’s Health Amendment
The Court should have considered public policy concerns, the
legislative record, and legal precedent when it interpreted the ACA’s
text and came to its conclusion.180
i.

The Court Was Wrong for Departing from Hobby
Lobby and Zubik

The Court’s holding significantly drifted from precedent
decisions like Hobby Lobby, which came to its conclusion under a
RFRA analysis. And while the Court in Little Sisters did not reach the
RFRA issue, Justice Thomas nevertheless maintained that RFRA could
compel the creation of the broad exemptions to protect employers’
religious rights.181 Justice Alito’s concurrence is dedicated to a RFRA
analysis,182 maintaining that the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA
since (1) the mandate substantially burdened an employer’s exercise of
religion since the employer would have to pay fines if they do not
comply with the mandate and the employer has a sincere religious belief
that “compliance with the mandate (through the accommodation or
otherwise) makes it complicit” in providing contraception to employees
“to which the employer has a religious objection;” (2) providing free
contraception to all women was not a compelling interest for different
reasons; and (3) the accommodation would not satisfy the “least
179 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, CVS Pharm. v. Doe, No. 20-1374, 2021 U.S. LEXIS
3572 (2021); Doe v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 982 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 2021
U.S. LEXIS 3572 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (No. 20-1374). CVS Pharmacy v. Doe will no longer
be argued as both parties agreed to dismiss the writ of certiorari. Joint Stipulation to Dismiss
at 1, CVS Pharm. v. Doe, No. 20-1374 (U.S. Nov. 11, 2021).
180
See Christina Gomez, Canons of Statutory Construction, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2017, at 23,
24 (explaining that courts may look to the legislative history of a statute in interpreting its
meaning). In the majority opinion, Justice Thomas himself stated that “the statute is
completely silent as to what the comprehensive guidelines must contain, or how HRSA must
go about creating them.” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367, 2380 (2020). See also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 744
(2014) (citing 158 CONG. REC. S539 (Feb. 9, 2012); 158 CONG. REC. S1162-S1173 (Mar. 1,
2012)) (stating that the Senate had originally voted down the “conscious amendment,” which
Justice Ginsburg argued meant that Congress “left health care decisions . . . in the hands of
women” and their health care providers).
181 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2377.
182 Id. at 2389 (Alito, J., concurring).
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restrictive means” standard because the government found no other
workable alternatives aside from the broad exemptions.183
Justice Alito asserted that depriving women of free
contraception is not one of the “gravest abuses” our government could
carry out, since there is no “constitutional right” to free contraception,
while at the same time ignoring the fact that RFRA, as many scholars
have noted, is not an obligatory accommodation.184 Further, Justice
Alito reasoned that the “deprivation of [cost-free contraceptive services]
is not a sufficient burden that would render the government’s interest
compelling,”185 despite the Court holding otherwise in Hobby Lobby,
where six of the Justices held that providing all women with seamless
access to all FDA-approved no-cost contraceptive services was a
compelling governmental interest.186 For instance, Justice Kennedy
noted in Hobby Lobby that the government has a compelling interest in
protecting women’s health by providing free contraception coverage,
which is a position that the majority had accepted.187
Ultimately, RFRA supports “a broad interpretation of
‘compelling interest.’”188 Congress concluded that a compelling interest
183

Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2391-94 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito found
different reasons as to why he believes free contraception under the ACA is not a compelling
government interest. He further maintains that access to free contraception is not a
constitutional right and thus is evidence “that Congress did not regard the provision of costfree contraceptives to all women as compelling.” Id.
184 Id. at 2392, 2396 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (stating that a
“compelling interest” within RFRA context requires an examination of “[o]nly the great
abuses, endangering paramount interest,” which could “give occasion for [a] permissible
limitation” on free exercise)). See also Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 168, at 348 (“[i]t is
easy to miss that RFRA is a ‘permissive’ accommodation – that is, a voluntary government
accommodation of religion that is not constitutionally required by the Free Exercise Clause”);
Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law
without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1904 (2001) (“In [RFRA’s]
applications to federal law, Congress made a blanket precommitment to protect religious liberty
against federal encroachment, beyond what the Supreme Court has held the Constitution to
require.”).
185 Reframing the Harm, supra note 154, at 2198.
186
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 687-88.
187 Id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2381
(“[W]e have previously ‘assumed’ [seamless access to contraception without cost sharing] is
a compelling governmental interest.”).
188 Reframing the Harm, supra note 154, at 2200 (citing Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE
L.J. 2516, 2580 (2015) (“[T]he language of RFRA supports a broad interpretation of
‘compelling interest,’ not Justice Alito’s newly cramped view. The reason is simple: RFRA
was meant to ‘restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder’ . . . . The Court in that era did not seem to question the existence of a
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test “is more workable for ‘striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests.’”189 The Court
failed to strike this balance when weighing competing governmental
interests in Little Sisters. This is exemplified in the outcome of the
overly broad exemptions, which would no longer ensure that women
employees have access to the same contraceptive services they had
access to after the Hobby Lobby decision.190
The next question then becomes whether there are other means
of achieving the compelling interest of affording women continued
access to contraception while accommodating the rights of religious
objectors. In Holt v. Hobbs, the Court held that: “[I]f a less restrictive
means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the
Government must use it.”191 The Hobby Lobby Court held that the
Departments had not met RFRA’s least restrictive means requirement
because other organizations and entities were offered alternative options
which the employers in the case were not offered.192 The broad
exemptions in Little Sisters, however, were not the “least restrictive
means” of achieving a compelling governmental interest, as there were
other workable alternatives the Departments could have implemented,
which is further explored in Section IV.C.193

compelling interest.”)). But see Wesley A. Prichard, Compelling Interest Cacodoxy: Why the
Contraception Mandate Fails RFRA’s Compelling Interest Analysis, 78 U. PITTSBURGH L.
REV. 245, 258 (2016) (citing Brief for Petitioners at 38-51, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13354) (using the Hobby Lobby decision to argue that “RFRA requires a ‘more focused inquiry’
whereby the government must consider the harms posed by the particular exemption at issue
. . .”)).
189 CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11490, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT: A PRIMER 1
(2020).
190 The difference between Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters is that in Hobby Lobby, the Court
allowed all employers, including for-profits, to utilize the accommodation process to exempt
themselves from the mandate, but women would still have seamless access to contraceptives at
the end of the day. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693.
191 574 U.S. 352, 265 (2015) (citing United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
815 (2000)).
192 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 738. See generally Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality?
Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 63, 65 (2015) (stating that the Hobby Lobby Court gave very little deference to the
Departments “on the question of whether there were less restrictive alternatives for fulfilling
the interests supporting the regulations at issue”).
193 See infra Section IV.C.
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The Court Did Not Adequately Consider the
Significance of the ACA’s Women’s Health Amendment
and Public Policy Concerns in Determining Congress’
Intent

The Little Sisters majority opined that contraceptive coverage is
not mentioned in the ACA and that the statute does not suggest that
Congress intended contraception to be covered.194 Justice Alito
specifically listed the different exceptions within the ACA that
disqualified some women from obtaining contraception.195 Yet, his
stance ignores the fact that many women nevertheless qualified under
the contraceptive mandate, casting aside the many efforts behind the
Women’s Health Amendment and gender-based legislation over the last
ten years. Moreover, it does not make sense “for Congress to have given
the Departments authority to create [the broad] exemptions because they
reintroduce the very health inequities and barriers to care that Congress
intended to eliminate when it enacted the women’s preventive services
provision of the ACA.”196
The history of birth control and contraception policy is
extensive,197 especially at the federal level, and the role of women’s
voices has mattered, and continues to matter, in shaping these policies.
Women in politics, such as Maryland’s Democratic Former Senator,
Barbara Mikulski, who introduced the Women’s Health Amendment,
are in a unique position to write, reform, and pass legislation that take
into account the health needs of women.198 But the Court should have
194

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2382
(2020).
195 Id. at 2392 (Alito, J., concurring).
196 Brief for Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 170, at 5 (citing Brief for Members of
Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (No 19-432)).
197 The Court has invalidated restrictions as burdens on reproductive freedom in the past. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding that a Connecticut law forbidding
married couples from using contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded on the right of marital
privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down restrictions on
contraception for unmarried people, stating that there is a right “to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child”); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634, 646 (1974)
(holding that a Cleveland School Board rule forcing pregnant women to go on unpaid maternity
leave was violative of the Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v.
Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State’s rights to interfere with a person’s most
basic decisions about family and parenthood.”).
198 See VANSICKLE-WARD & WALLSTEN, supra note 173, at 8 (citing CHRISTOPHER F.
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amply considered the work of women and the history of the Women’s
Health Amendment to make a unique difference in women’s lives. This
is further demonstrated by the fact that the Departments never disputed
HRSA’s prior finding that the contraceptive mandate is “necessary for
women’s health and well-being,” suggesting that the Departments were
aware that this mandate was critical to women’s health concerns from
the beginning when the mandate was first created.199
To correct the fact that the ACA had left out preventive care
specific to women, Former Senator Mikulski, who worked with
women’s health advocates and various medical professionals,
introduced the Women’s Health Amendment (WHA), which added to
the ACA’s coverage requirements.200 In 2009, the Senate, in a vote of
61-39, passed the WHA, which “would expand coverage of women’s
health care, allowing the government to require insurers to cover
preventive care and screenings for women at little or [no] cost to
them.”201 The WHA “is directed at eradicating gender-based disparities
in access to preventive care,”202 and was specifically passed in order to
address women’s health coverage.203 The new amendment was carefully
“designed ‘to promote equality in women’s access to health care,’
KARPOWITZ & TALI MENDELBERG, SILENT SEX: GENDER, DELIBERATION, & INSTITUTIONS
(2014)); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE DIFFERENCE “DIFFERENCE” MAKES, 110-13 (2003)
(“[W]omen in elected office carry unique responsibilities for women . . . . who depend
disproportionately on the leadership of women who hold public office because such women are
most likely to give priority to women’s concerns,” and when women lead “they will bring to the
effort the experience of being a woman and often a special sensitivity to the needs of other
women.”).
199 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., concurring). See also Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 741 (2014) (“Congress acted on that understanding when, as part of a
nationwide insurance program intended to be comprehensive, it called for coverage of
preventive care responsive to women’s needs. Carrying out Congress’ direction, the [(HHS)],
in consultation with public health experts, promulgated regulations requiring group health
plans to cover all forms of contraception approved by the [(FDA)]. The genesis of this
coverage should enlighten the Court’s resolution of these cases.”).
200 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This health care bill
won against Republican Senator Murkowski’s amendment, which opposed the Women’s Health
Amendment. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health
Amendment,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2009),
https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passes-womens-healthamendment/.
201 Maggie Mertens, Senate Passes Mikulski’s Overhaul Amendment on Women’s Health, NPR
(Dec.
3,
2009),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2009/12/senate_passes_womens_health_am.html. See also Adam Sonfield, The Women’s
Health Amendment Is Getting an Update. What Should It Include?, HEALTH AFFS., (Sept. 14,
2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160914.056558/full/ (demonstrating
the evidence-based efforts to improve women’s health care).
202 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2406 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 2405.
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countering gender-based discrimination and disparities in such
access.”204 The contraceptive mandate significantly shaped women’s
lives205 and was used by millions of women.206
Women have come a long way in overcoming gender disparity
and stereotypes, but these achievements are often set back by court
decisions that do not fully take into account women’s issues.207 There is
no denying “that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination,”208 and while the Court has been reluctant to remedy
past discrimination or compensate for past adverse treatment on gender,
the Court here should, at the very least, have considered issues of gender
equality when making its decision.209
As the dissent pointed out, access to contraception “enables
women to chart their own life’s course,” and contraception improves
204

Id. at 2401 (citing Brief for Members of Congress, supra note 196). See also 155 CONG.
REC. 2019, 2028 (2009); RHODE, supra note 198, at 114 (“Elected women have the power to
help bring larger changes by pressing a bill with comprehensive objectives in keeping with
the needs of children, women, and families.”).
205 VANSICKLE-WARD & WALLSTEN, supra note 173, at 4 (explaining that contraception
improved the overall quality of women’s lives, expanded access to, and insurance coverage of,
contraception, all of which is directly associated to women’s economic success, political
empowerment, and health and well-being).
206
See Kaiser Fam. Found., Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, STATE
HEALTH FACTS, https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/health-insurance-coverage-of-thetotal-population-cps/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (stating that about fifty percent of the country’s
population receive employer-sponsored health insurance); Women’s Health Insurance
Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.kff.org/womens-healthpolicy/fact-sheet/womens-health-insurance-coverage/ (finding that of the 98 million women
ages 19-64 in 2020, about 60 million women, or sixty-one percent, received health coverage
from their employer-sponsored insurance); see also Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2402
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
207 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (demonstrating that the crux
of Justice Ginsburg’s argument is how impactful and harmful the use of gender stereotypes is
and what that means for a woman’s place in society).
208 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). Historically, society
had tried to keep women out of the work force, and labor laws had been designed to remove
women from marketplace or preserve them for lower paying jobs. See id. at 685.
209 The Court has shied away from correcting past wrongs. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding “that government can never have
a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction”); Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination
Through Government’s Spending Power, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has consistently held that a desire to remedy societal discrimination provides a
constitutionally inadequate basis for race-conscious affirmative action plans”). But see Nadine
Taub, The Relevance of Disparate Impact Analysis in Reaching for Gender Equality, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 941, 941 (1996) (“[I]t is necessary to look closely at policies and practices
that have a disproportionate effect on one sex.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the
Establishment Clause, 67 VANDERBILT L. REV. 51, 66 (2014).
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women’s overall social and economic status by allowing them to “invest
in higher education and a career with far less risk of an unplanned
pregnancy.”210 There is no arguing that “women remain
underrepresented at the top and overrepresented at the bottom in both
the public and private sectors;”211 women do a disproportionate share of
childcare and elder care, and women are often times forced to choose
between their careers and families. The Court’s ruling in upholding the
exemptions may effectively exacerbate these policy concerns. Thus, the
Court should have considered that limiting women’s ability to make an
informed choice may have drastic consequences on their overall wellbeing.
Lastly, the Supreme Court has considered the goals and
objectives behind a certain law or statute when deciding cases. In Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., which found that disparate impact claims are
recognized under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Court relied on the
statute’s text as well as the statute’s purpose in coming to its
conclusion.212 The Court found that in addition to the statute’s language,
FHA’s purpose was “to eradicate discriminatory practices” in housing
decisions.213 Similarly, the Court should have given weight to the
purpose behind the WHA, which was enacted to improve women’s
health, eradicate gender-based discrimination and disparities in access
to health care, and lower the costs for many women, who have
historically paid more for preventive services than men.214
210 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2402 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.”); The Affordable Care Act’s Birth Control Benefit, supra note
152 (explaining that the “decision of whether or when to have children is one of the most
important economic decisions a woman will make in her lifetime”); PERRYUNDEM, supra note
152 (explaining that polls show that among voters, nearly three-quarters believe that “access to
affordable birth control affects a family’s financial situation and is an important part of equality
for women.”). See generally Martha J. Bailey, More Power to the Pill: The Impact of
Contraceptive Freedom on Women’s Life Cycle Labor Supply, 121 Q.J. ECON. 289, 318 (2006)
(explaining that the overall large increase in women’s labor force participation between 1970
and 1990 was largely attributed to the birth control pill).
211 RHODE, supra note 198, at 54.
212 576 U.S. 519, 532 (2015).
213 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 576 U.S. at 539 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601; and then
citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 15 (1988)) (“It is the policy of the United States to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States,” and FHA
“provides a clear national policy against discrimination in housing.”).
214 See Brief for Members of Congress, supra note 196 (citing 156 CONG. REC. 3978 (2010)
(statement of Rep. Woosley)) (“Today, women are forced to settle for less health care at a higher
price. We pay as much as 50 percent more than men, a practice of discrimination that is legal in
38 states.”); see also Gedicks & Koppleman, supra note 209, at 53.
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C. The Court Should Have Applied the APA’s Arbitrary and
Capricious Standard to the Exemptions Because They Were
Overly Broad
One of the overarching issues in Little Sisters deals with
administrative law and whether the Departments met the procedural
requirements of providing notice to create the final exemptions under
the APA.215 However, even if the Departments were statutorily and
procedurally permitted to create the exemptions, the Court should have
struck down the exemptions based on the APA’s arbitrary and
capricious standard, which is a standard of review utilized by judicial
courts when reviewing decisions made by administrative bodies.216
The arbitrary and capricious standard is utilized to ensure that
an agency is acting with “reasoned [decision making].”217 Section
706(2)(A) of the APA “instructs courts reviewing regulations to
invalidate any agency action found to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’”218 Ultimately,
courts can assess whether the agency has promulgated an arbitrary and
capricious rule if the agency failed “to consider an important aspect of
the problem [or] offe[r] an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before [it].”219
215 While this case note does not discuss the APA notice requirements and the APA claims
brought by both parties, the Court ultimately held that the government had satisfied APA
requirements. See supra Part III; Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 555-56 (3d Cir.
2019) (holding that because the HHS and DOL promulgated regulations contrary to the ACA
and Congress’ intent, the APA was violated). But see Kristin E. Hickman, Did Little Sisters of
the Poor Just Gut APA Rulemaking Procedures?, YALE J. REGUL. (July 9, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/did-little-sisters-of-the-poor-just-gut-apa-rulemakingprocedures/ (explaining that “Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court turns APA notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures into a pro forma exercise of procedural box-checking that will
allow agencies to curtail meaningful public participation in the agency rulemaking process”).
216 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
217 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2398
(2020) (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015)). See also
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (holding that agencies
need to provide a reason for their actions); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015) (citing
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))
(“Agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the relevant factors.’”).
218 See § 706(2)(A); see also Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2383 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs.
Assn., 463 U.S. at 43) (explaining that an agency can fail this test when it has not given “a
satisfactory explanation for its action”).
219 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2383-84. See also APA: Informal Rulemaking,
Arbitrary
and
Capricious
Standard,
L.
UNIV.
HOUSTON,
https://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/jmantel/health-regulatoryprocess/ArbitraryandCapriciousStandard.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2021) (stating that some other
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The exemptions HRSA and the Departments issued give “every
appearance of coming up short” on the APA standard.220 And while
protecting one’s religious rights as well as ensuring women affordable
birth control coverage are two values that have consistently clashed, as
demonstrated in this case, the government could have better
accommodated the needs of employers and women employees through
means other than the broad blanket exemptions.
First, the Departments failed to adequately take into account the
impact of the exemptions on women.221 While the Departments never
disputed “HRSA’s prior finding that the mandate is ‘necessary for
women’s health and well-being,’”222 the Departments later disputed the
fact “that women will be adversely impacted by the 2018 exemptions,”
despite all the evidence pointing to the contrary.223 The Departments
also erroneously assume that women could obtain seamless access to
contraception through other means, thus downplaying the harm the
broad exemptions will cause to women employees, students, and
dependents on these health plans.224 Therefore, “the government’s
factors courts consider are whether the agency examined relevant data when making its decision;
whether the agency articulated a satisfactory explanation that connects facts or conclusions to
the policy choice; whether the agency considered important aspects of the problem; and whether
the agency considered all regulatory alternatives).
220 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2398 (Kagan, J., concurring).
221 See infra Sections IV.A & IV.B.
222 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Women’s
Preventive Services Guidelines, supra note 49; Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,537
(Jan. 14, 2019) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)).
223 Id. at 2381 (majority opinion) (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,805
(Oct. 6, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)). See e.g.,
Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,803 (“[T]he Mandate as applied to objecting
employers appears to encompass a relatively small percentage of the number of women
impacted by the Mandate overall, since most employers do not appear to have conscientious
objections to the Mandate.”).
224 See Brief for Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 170, at 15-16 (“The Departments also
incorrectly assume that those who lose contraceptive coverage can alternatively access
contraception through existing government-sponsored programs, such as Title X, Medicaid, and
state-run programs.”); The Affordable Care Act’s Birth Control Benefit, supra note 152
(explaining that the Title X family planning system is overburdened and underfunded, Planned
Parenthood clinics are facing increasing threats from federal and state policymakers, and many
of these public programs only provide free contraception “to those that meet certain income
thresholds”). Moreover, the contraceptive mandate allowed women access to contraceptive
services that was not dependent on their income, the state in which they live, or the health plan
they chose. Thus, the blanket exemptions would create an undue burden by leaving women to
look elsewhere for these services. Id. See Usha Ranji, Yali Bair & Alina Salganicoff, Medicaid
and Family Planning: Background and Implications of the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 3,
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failure [in Little Sisters] to consider third-party harms rendered the
religious exemption arbitrary and capricious.”225
Moreover, courts have held that policies are arbitrary and
capricious when they hurt more people than they help and thus, are not
a product of reasoned judgment.226 For example, in the case of
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, the Court found that the Department of Homeland Security’s
order to rescind the DACA program was arbitrary and capricious,
holding that “the agency failed to consider the conspicuous issues of
whether to retain forbearance and what if anything to do about the
hardship to DACA recipients.”227 The Court did not utilize this
approach in Little Sisters. As Justice Kagan pointed out, the exemptions’
“overbreadth causes serious harm, by the Departments’ own lights,” and
while the Departments committed “themselves to minimizing the
impact on contraceptive coverage” on religious employers,” they “failed
to fulfill that commitment to women.”228
Next, the Departments did not consider workable alternatives to
the exemptions.229 The self-certification accommodation process was
specifically created to accommodate religious employers while
continuing to provide working women with coverage. In Hobby Lobby,
the Court noted that the Departments worked with other alternatives,
deciding that extending the accommodation process to for-profit
corporations was the less burdensome alternative.230 But the
Departments admitted that after Zubik, they could find no workable
alternative to satisfy both the needs of religious employers and female

2016), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-family-planning-appendix-1-womenwith-full-medicaid-benefits-and-share-that-are-reproductive-age-by-state/view/print/.
225 Affordable Care Act—Contraceptive Mandate, supra note 120, at 568.
226 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015) (“No regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it
does significantly more harm than good.”); see also Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2408,
n.18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,577-78 (Nov.
15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)) (stating that the
number of women affected by the exemptions may be even higher depending if more plans use
the exemptions over the accommodation process).
227 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (holding that the rescission of DACA was arbitrary and
capricious because it failed to consider important aspects of the problem).
228 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., concurring).
229 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014) (“There are other ways in
which Congress or HHS could equally ensure that every woman has cost-free access to the
particular contraceptives at issue here and, indeed, to all FDA-approved contraceptives.”).
230 140 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 730-31 (2014)).
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employees.231 However, the Departments could have extended the broad
exemptions to only churches and religious non-profits, while keeping
the accommodations process intact for all other entities. The Obama
administration presumed that employees of churches or houses of
worship were more likely to share in the religious beliefs of their
employers, and thus, the effect on third parties would be smaller.232 This
presumption may even be extended to some non-profits, such as the
Little Sisters, a group of nuns engaged in non-profit work.233 To extend
this presumption to virtually any employer is unreasonable.234
Another option the Departments could have explored was to
start out by only fully exempting those employers who had issues with
the accommodation process, such as the Little Sisters. There is a chance
that the broad exemptions could invite a whole range of people who
otherwise would have been fine using the accommodation process.235
Thus, as Justice Kagan notes, the exemptions “went beyond what the

Id. (quoting DEP’T OF LAB., FAQS ABOUT AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IMPLEMENTATION (PART
XXVI)
4
(2017),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/ouractivities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-xxvi.pdf.
232 Brief for Respondents at 44, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367
(2020) (Nos. 19-431 & 19-454) (“Unlike the church exemption, the agencies present no
evidence that all employees, students, and female beneficiaries share their employer’s faith or
religious views on contraception.”).
233 But see Dorothy Guerrero, Nonprofit Leadership: Is There a Gender Gap?, MISSION BOX
GLOB. NETWORK (June 20, 2020), https://www.missionbox.com/article/127/nonprofitleadership-is-there-a-gender-gap (“majority of the nonprofit workforce – more than 75 percent
in some U.S. sectors – is female.”); RHODE, supra note 198, at 54 (explaining that while women
are overrepresented in the public and non-profit sectors, they are nevertheless underrepresented
in leadership positions within the public realm). The exemptions are likely to affect mostly nonprofit and public entities, which is a significant concern considering women remain
overrepresented in the non-profit world. Id.
234 Tanner J. Bean & Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Administrative State as a New Front in the
Culture War: Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, CATO S. CT. REV. 229, 230-31 (2020)
(citing Very Few Americans See Contraception as Morally Wrong, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 28,
2016) (finding that of “‘Catholics who attend Mass weekly, just 13% say contraception is
morally wrong, while 45% say it is morally acceptable and 42% say it is not a moral issue’”);
Beldon Russonello, 2016 Survey of Catholic Likely Voters, CATHS. FOR CHOICE (2021) (finding
that nearly eight in ten Catholics agree that “‘health insurance companies should be required to
offer health plans that include birth control’”); Brief for Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 170,
at 15-16 (citing RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE, COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM:
NEW EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE, GUTTMACHER INST. 4 (2011) (“Among
all women who have had sex, 99% have ever used a contraceptive method other than natural
family planning. This figure is virtually the same, 98%, among sexually experienced Catholic
women.”).
235 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“So the
Departments . . . should have exempted only employers who had religious objections to the
accommodation – not those who viewed it as a religiously acceptable device for complying with
the mandate.”).
231
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Departments’ justification supported.”236 Additionally, the Departments
themselves realized the possibility that employers without a religious
objection to the accommodation process could now simply switch to the
new exemptions.237
Moreover, the Departments could have minimized the
exemptions’ impact on women by not extending the blanket exemptions
to closely held, for-profit companies. While Justice Alito does not agree
with this view,238 many courts agree that the norm for for-profit
companies is to maximize shareholder value and the corporation’s
overall value.239 Thus, the first and foremost purpose of any corporation
is not to pursue religious objectives, which is the case for organizations
like the Little Sisters, but nevertheless may be one aspect of the business
purpose.240 Furthermore, as Justice Kagan noted, it is rare for publicly
traded corporations to assert RFRA rights, calling into question

236 Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
237 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2399, n.3 (Kagan, J., concurring). See also Brief for
Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., supra note 170, at 8 (stating that the Departments “provide no basis for
the assumption that any entities will voluntarily continue to comply with the ‘accommodation’
if given the opportunity to exempt themselves.”).
238 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014) (“If for-profit
corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not
further religious objectives as well.”).
239 Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine – The Social Responsibility of Business Is To
Increase
Its
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
30,
1970,
at
SM17,
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibilityof-business-is-to.html (“‘[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business: to . . .
engage in activities designed to increase its profits . . . .”). See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
204 Mich. 459 (1919) (standing for the proposition that corporate directors cannot pursue
actions that do not increase profits or shareholder wealth and the objective of directors’ duties
is to maximize this wealth); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N. J. 145 (1953) (disbursing
funds to philanthropic or other public causes must benefit or advance the interests of the
corporation).
240 See Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 3, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-154 & 13356) (stating that attributing to a corporation the religious identity of its controlling shareholder
is contrary to corporate law); Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty: Why
Corporations Are Not Entitled to Religious Exemptions, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y 1, 6
(explaining that a for-profit corporation’s primary purpose is to make money, while a church’s
main goal is to practice and promulgate religion). But see Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman,
Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are
RFRA
Persons,
127
HARV.
L.
REV.
F.
273,
274
(2014),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/05/hobby-lobby-corporate-law-and-the-theory-of-the-firm/
(“In the real world, shareholders impose religiously motivated policies on corporations all the
time.”).

RUBIS

378

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 21:2

“whether the Departments adequately supported their choice” to allow
publicly traded companies to claim the religious exemption.241
Lastly, similarly to the accommodation process, the
Departments could have required those employers who wished to opt
out of including contraception in their health plans to send a list of their
employees to their insurer or TPA, who could then reach out to those
employees to determine if they would like continued no-cost
contraceptive services, and the insurer or TPA could then provide
payments for it. Some religious employers may find that sending a list
of their employees may still go against their religious beliefs. In such
cases, another option is for employees who no longer have access to
contraception in their employee health plans because their employer
utilized the exemption to have the opportunity to then reach out to the
insurer or TPA themselves and fill out a form expressing that they would
like to continue obtaining cost-free contraception apart from their
employee health plans, which would essentially have the same outcome
as the accommodation process under the old regime. This would
circumvent the Little Sisters’ complicity argument since Little Sisters
would take no affirmative steps in notifying their insurance issuer
themselves.242
D. The Court Failed to Address Important Constitutional Law
Questions
The majority of the Court, as it was then constituted, was
reluctant to delve deeper into the Constitutional law issues in this case,
241

See Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., concurring). Compare Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S. at 710-12 (“Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not
protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make
money. This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law . . . . While it is certainly true
that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does
not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many
do not do so.”), with Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 739-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In a decision
of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along
with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they
judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”).
242 See Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2391 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito states
that the Little Sisters’ religious rights “would not be ‘infringed’ if they did not have to do
anything ‘more than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all forms of
contraception,’ even if their employee receive[d] cost-free contraceptive coverage from the
same insurance company.” Id. (emphasis added). The Little Sisters have also expressed that
they have no convictions against their employees who utilize contraception; they just want no
part in it. See id. at 2410 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Counsel for the Little Sisters acknowledged
as much when he conceded that religious ‘employers could [not] object at all’ to a ‘government
obligation’ to provide contraceptive coverage ‘imposed directly on the insurers.’”)
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creating a difficult road ahead around questions regarding women’s
reproductive rights and the way the Court sees these rights in conflict
with religious free exercise rights. Little Sisters is the intersection point
of many big, hot button issues—issues the Court appears not yet ready
to act on.
For instance, Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer strategically
structured the concurrence around the Chevron Doctrine, perhaps due
to the fact that there have been rumblings around the Court about
moving away from Chevron.243 While their concurrence was not an
outcome that favored the provision of contraceptive care for women, it
may have been their attempt at preserving Chevron. On the other hand,
Justice Alito seems worried about the question of limiting the
government’s ability to make reproductive health decisions.244
This case upholds the broad exemptions without making any
new law, and the Court appears to be writing for the future on adjacent
issues they see coming up again in the next couple of terms. Hanging in
the balance of the Court’s decision are a myriad of issues, including Free

243
See Daniel M. Ortner, The End of Deference: The States That Have Rejected Deference,
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (March 24, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-end-ofdeference-the-states-that-have-rejected-deference-by-daniel-m-ortner/; James Goodwin, Will
Confirming Judge Barrett be the Death of Chevron Deference?, THE EQUATION (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://blog.ucsusa.org/guest-commentary/will-confirming-judge-barrett-be-the-death-ofchevron-deference/ (“A key item on that agenda is overturning something called Chevron
deference . . .”). Many conservative justices on the Court are overall distrustful of the
administrative state. See Robert F. Nagel, Conservatives and the Court, NAT’L AFFS.,
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/conservatives-and-the-court (last visited
Oct. 28, 2021) (explaining that the administrative state overturning precedent conflicts with
some of the tenets of conservativism). It is hard to say whether this deference will continue on
the Court’s majority, which likely depends on the Administration at the given point in time.
Perhaps the Court may have enough counter leverage with the developing interest in the Free
Exercise Clause. See Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Weaponization of the FreeExercise
Clause,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
18,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization-free-exerciseclause/616373/ (explaining that conservative justices have been attempting to weaponize the
Free Exercise Clause to privilege the beliefs of religious employers over federal
nondiscrimination laws). Justices on the Court may also choose to accord deference to agencies
insofar as they do not trench on religious freedoms. See Erin Morrow Hawley, Symposium:
Administrative Law Lessons from King v. Burwell, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/symposium-administrative-law-lessons-from-king-vburwell/. Either way, the Court was significantly deferential to the then Trump administration
when deciding this case and may have to deal with the fall out of that in the upcoming years
under the new administration.
244 Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron,
Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2008).
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Exercise, agency deference, delegation issues,245 Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process, rights surrounding privacy and abortion,
religious freedom, and how much it will all impact government decision
making. Ultimately, this is a case that poses more questions than it
answers. And while the Court has an obligation to equally balance
weighty constitutional values, the Court does not go there in Little
Sisters. The Court created a foundation for upcoming issues while
avoiding the broader constitutional law questions. This direction may
be predictive of the Court majority strengthening the First Amendment
and weakening privacy cases over the upcoming terms, which could
have serious implications for reproductive rights and other civil rights
protections.246 One thing appears to be certain, however – that the fight
in Little Sisters is not over.247
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court incorrectly decided Little Sisters, and it should not
have upheld the broad religious and moral exemptions. Both the
contraceptive mandate accommodation and the blanket exemptions fell
short of protecting women’s rights to affordable health care and
contraceptive coverage. The Court should have taken a more balanced
approach – one that respects the religious beliefs of objecting employers
without overwhelming the rights of those who do not share in those
beliefs. Ultimately, the Court failed to adequately weigh the
exemptions’ detrimental impact on women.248 The Court should have
given greater weight to the history of the Women’s Health Amendment,
the role of gender in shaping policy, and legal precedent.249 The Court
should have also utilized the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary
and capricious standard when analyzing the exemptions.250 Lastly, the
Court’s decision leaves many legal questions unanswered, which may
have broader implications in the areas of constitutional law, civil rights
law, and women’s rights issues.251

245

This was addressed by Justice Thomas in the majority opinion. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct.
at 2382 (“No party has pressed a constitutional challenge to the breadth of the delegation
involved here.”).
246 Affordable Care Act — Contraceptive Mandate, supra note 120 at 560.
247 Smith, et al., supra note 178.
248 See supra Section IV.A.
249 See supra Section IV.B.
250 See supra Section IV.C.
251 See supra Section IV.D.

